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1 Introduction 
 
Regionalism and tribalism is, today, a problem that may disturb each and every 
citizen of Kyrgyzstan. Politicians, analytics, scientists and the mass media do not cease 
to speak about the danger of such phenomena. In the opinion of some, this 
phenomena represent a real threat not only to the stability of the state but even to the 
very existence of the Kirghiz Republic. The main argument is that rivalry between 
northern and southern regional groups undermines national unity and may well become 
a source of internal strife.  
Authorities apply different methods to try to resolve this problem.
1 
The authors of 
the Strategy of Development of the Country 2007-2010 have noted the problem.
2
 
Having recognized the important role of state institutions, they also emphasize that the 
main initiator of, and the engine of the struggle against nepotism and regionalism, 
should be civil society - which fact has also been recognized by representatives of 
NGOs.
3
  
This report takes a look at the potential role of civil sector organizations in moves to 
be made against nepotism and regionalism within the limitations of the Strategy for 
Development of the Country 2007-2010; and it studies possible actions that might 
come from NGOs and other civil society organizations to counteract the phenomenon. 
The basic purpose here is to develop a set of recommendations for use by civil sector 
organizations. 
  
The report is divided into three parts: 
 
1)   The Problem: this part examines the roots of the given problem. What are the 
reasons for the possible split of society on the basis of a regional belonging?  
 
2)   Purposes and tasks: here, we look at what can be done by organizations of civil 
society, and we also identify related purposes and tasks.   
                                            
1
 Example: the introduction of criminal liability for statements leading to inter-regional hostility. 
2
 Strategy of Development of the Country (СРС) 2006-2010, points 66 and 67.   
3
 Forum – NGO 2007, 11 July 2007, Bishkek.  
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3) Recommendations: this part asks how one might actually work with these 
objectives, to be able to act and deal specifically with issues and concerns.  
 
The results obtained in this report are based on field research done in all regions 
and in the capital of Kyrgyzstan, which was carried out from June 2006 to July 2007.  
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2 Regional division as a social problem 
2.1. Nepotism 4 
There are some minor differences in practices of tradition, pronunciation, and 
mentality among the inhabitants of different regions of Kyrgyzstan; and there is a 
traditional division of uruu (tribes) in the two tribal confederations.
5
 Today, however, 
this is more "folklore”, and it does not have any functional role to play in society.  
These distinctions and the traditional clan/regional division is not a problem per se, 
i.e. as it seems to some researchers and politicians. Our field research has shown that 
the local population of various regions do not feel any feelings of antipathy or rivalry 
towards the other. From among interviewed respondents from different regions 
(excepting the capital, Bishkek), no-one gave a positive answered to the question « Are 
you personally disturbed by natives of other regions? ». Indeed, there seems to be an 
absence of any disputed subject. This question was answered in the affirmative mainly 
by inhabitants of the capital – for perhaps these persons are more involved in the 
rivalries for resources, which are concentrated by and large in the capital and its 
vicinity.  
Yet, during the interviews, some regional inhabitants did refer to natives of other 
regions when referring to incidents that might be construed as discrimination - though it 
was not based on personal experience. When asked “Who told you this?”, interviewees 
referred to local elite representatives. The latter said that they had personally come 
across displays of regional discrimination in state structures, chiefly in the capital. 
However, it was also surmised that such things were more likely examples of 
                                            
4
 Nepotism, used here as favoritism granted to relatives or close friends, without regard to their merit. 
See: Alexander I. D. The evolution of social behavior, Annual Review of Anthropology 5: 325-383, 1974. 
5
 Kirghiz traditional social structure consisted of forty different tribal unions (uruu), approximately, based 
on family relations. Each tribal union consisted of various family divisions. These tribal unions have 
merged into three big confederations. This structure was the basis of the political organization of Kyrgyz. 
Each tribal union had political sovereignty and its own territory – in the north and the south - which today 
corresponds with the regional division. For detailed research into the Kirghiz traditional social structure, 
see: Israilova C., Traditsionnoe obshestvo kyrgyzov v period russkoi kolonizatsii vo vtoroi polovine XIX - 
nachala XX v., i sistema ikh rodstva, Ylym, Bishkek, 1999. 
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corruption
6
 rather than regional discrimination. Further research into this confirmed 
such conclusions.  
In difficult transition period conditions - which Kyrgyzstan is experiencing today - it is 
not easy for the population to adapt to new economic conditions. The state is not able 
to provide people with the necessary conditions of social protection. Social vulnerability 
compels people to seek the help of informal social institutions, in which a basic element 
is a traditional solidarity - tooganchilik. Such institutions help give some social security 
to affiliates/participants by means of a guarantee of mutual aid. Thus, after 
independence, the practice of solidarity by means of informal institutions has gained 
wide application in society; and one such institution is a patronage network that is 
based on a ‘synthesis’ of belonging to a specific administrative-territorial unit and 
kinship.  
The practice of such solidarity would not create any problems if it remained outside 
the structures of official state organizations. However, this phenomenon not only takes 
place within the parameters of official bodies - it also (and often) takes up a dominating 
position not only in personnel selection but also when there are political moves made 
by groups of elites seeking power and to gain access to resources.  
The solidarity based on territorial/clan belonging is actively used by corrupted elites. 
The corrupted chief aspires to bring into his office people belonging to his solidarity 
grouping; for, for him, it is firstly a way of guaranteeing his own security. This corrupted 
chief seldom deals with bribes personally - he prefers it to do through subordinates. 
Negotiations about transfers of money are done by a subordinate; and when he (the 
latter) receives a bribe he keeps a minor part for himself and the rest is transferred to 
the former. Thus, the chief has no open contact with the briber. Such a way of 
operating is done with a view to protecting the chief from being caught red-handed.  
For an effective functioning of this ‘scheme’ the chief needs mechanisms of informal 
control over his subordinates. Such informal control is used so as to prevent 
subordinates from concealing a large part of money; and it also prevents a subordinate 
who has been caught red-handed from revealing the complicity of his chief. If a 
subordinate does point to the complicity of his chief, the chief has an opportunity to put 
pressure on the subordinate via common relatives, family, aksakals, etc.
7
 If carrying out 
                                            
6
 Kyrgyzstan is 150
th
, from among 178, in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 
CPI 2007.  
7
 From interviews with tax inspection, customs and Ministry of Internal Affairs employees. 
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corruption activities, such mechanisms of control strengthen the security of corrupted 
officials, and also provide better controls over illegal financial movements. An 
interviewed head (with an average level in the hierarchy) of a customs department 
explained: “When one works in the place where I work, he should remember that, first, 
his position is not secure; and, secondly, his shadow income depends on his 
subordinates. Hence, one needs informal methods of control over one’s subordinates”. 
Thus, in personnel selection, behind a question such as « Where do you come 
from? » is covered an intention, namely “How can I control and use you more 
effectively?”. Hence, why there are incidences of regionalism/tribalism in state 
structures is not a hostility to natives of other regions - it is, simply, corruption. Yet a 
person seeing corruption in certain state institutions and finding out that given officials 
are natives of the same region will believe that the causes of their seeking bribes and a 
biased personnel selection is hostility and antipathy towards natives of his region.  
Thus, corruption, faulty interpretations of occurrences and erroneous estimations 
will lead to the formation of negative opinions about natives of the other region; and 
such divisive opinions may potentially threaten stability and undermine national unity.
8
 
Such a situation is actively made use of by regional elites who, seeking to achieve their 
political and mercantile objectives, often mobilize people using patronage networks and 
the rhetoric of regionalism. 
Regional divisions in Kyrgyz and traditional institutions of solidarity are not a 
problem that menaces the stability of the state. In any state, regional contradictions do 
exist, and not only regional – for there are also many other social conflicts that divide a 
society. The problem is that in Kyrgyzstan these traditional institutions based on 
territorial and clan-family solidarity are used by a corrupted elite and officials within the 
framework of state structures.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
8
 A similar conclusion with regard to ethnic conflict is arrived at by  Tatu Vanhanen in his article “Domestic 
Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative Analysis”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 
1, 55-73 (1999), where he states that a cause of ethnic conflicts is the practice of nepotism. 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES / INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
 9 
2.2 State capture 
 
Another cause of aggravation of the regional issue is the form of government 
created during the first 15 years of Kyrgyzstan’s independence, which is characterized 
by the existence of strong presidential power, restraint of oppositional movements, and 
clan-family rule.  
During 15 years of independence, the Constitution of the Kirghiz Republic has been 
reformed three times, always strengthening powers of the president. The government, 
the heads of local state administration and judicial authority all depend on the 
president. Authority has been concentrated in the hands of just one person, which has 
given him considerable powers that are easy to use in the area of corruption.  
In the reality of Kirghiz society, the expanded authority of the president leads to 
nepotism and corruption, as the head of state uses any opportunity to give key 
positions his relatives and people who are faithful to him, without taking into account 
their professional competences. It is no secret that a major principle of personnel 
selection is loyalty to the president. In turn, the president’s protéges can then employ 
their own relatives and friends by this principle. As a result, there is a usurpation of 
power by the elite of one of the two regions. This practice strengthens the authority of 
the president still more, giving him informal mechanisms of control over state 
institutions. So there is now the phenomenon that scientists have named « state 
capture ».
9
  
Thus, power is concentrated in the hands of one person, someone who, in the 
opinion of some, is not only head of the state but also personifies, first of all, the region 
of his origin; and, via this, personifies the rule of the country by natives of this region. 
That is why the majority of the inhabitants of the president’s region support his rule – 
and, in the main, those persons from the non-presidential region deplore the situation; 
so that there is « a geographical split in opinions ».  
For example, according to research undertaken by the International Republican 
Institute, from May 2007
10
, inhabitants of the southern region have been inclined to 
think that for last 12 months their lives have been changing for the better; they believe 
                                            
9
 Combating corruption in a transition period. Contribution to a discussion of strategy, World Bank, 
Washington, Federal district of Columbia, 2000. 
10
 Kyrgyzstan National Opinion Poll, IRI, May 2007: http://www.iri.org/eurasia/kyrgyzstan.asp 
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that economic and democratic developments are on the right path. However, most 
persons’ living in the northern region and Bishkek think the contrary, i.e. they reckon 
that their lives have worsened in comparison with earlier. 
This is clearly shown in the following tables:  
  
 
 
 
54
22
55
20
30
37
63
17
4
10 9
15
76
60
29
0
20
40
60
80
100
North South Rural Urban (without
Bishkek)
Bishkek
Right direction Wrong direction Don't know / No answer 
 
Source: Kyrgyzstan National Opinion Poll, May 2007, International Republican Institute. 
How satisfied are you with the way democracy is developing in 
Kyrgyzstan? 
10
11
2
15
26
43
47
26
56
45
27
27
41
19
19
14
8
22
5
9
5
7
10
6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Bishkek
Rural
Urban
North
South
Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied
Somewhat dissatisfied Very dissatisfied
DK/NA
  
Source: Kyrgyzstan National Opinion Poll, May 2007, International Republican Institute. 
Generally speaking, Kyrgyzstan is developing in 
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Such tables show a sharp distinction between the opinions of inhabitants of the north 
and the south concerning democratic procedures, the economic development of the 
country and also concerning general policy made by the current authorities. Inhabitants 
of the southern region are therefore more inclined to support developments occurring 
under the direction of the president (who is from the south); while inhabitants of the 
northern region are more likely to be critical.  
In the given social conditions, the presidential form of government - with strongly 
pronounced characteristics of authoritarianism and nepotism - is fraught with 
destabilization and could split society, especially during re-election times. When the 
president stands for re-election for a second term or more, feelings of injustice appear 
among representatives of the non-presidential region; and there is a natural antipathy 
not only towards representatives of the elite but also among common citizens from the 
non-presidential region. In such a case, a non-constructive oppositional elite - based on 
the regional division - arises, and simple citizens have requirements of regional 
rotation. Such a system does not lead to stability, as an antagonism between two elites 
may well lead to chronic, forced changes of authority - as happened in March 24th 
2005.
11
 As well-known sociologist Juan Linz states: “The danger that zero-sum 
presidential elections pose is compounded by the rigidity of the president's fixed term in 
office. Winners and losers are sharply defined for the entire period of the presidential 
mandate - losers need to wait four or five years without any access to executive power 
or patronage. The zero-sum game in presidential regimes raises the stakes of 
presidential elections and inevitably exacerbates their attendant tension and 
polarization.”
12
  
                                            
11
 Developed after the March, 24th, 2005 events, a tradition of authorities seeking a regional balance - the 
president is from one region, the prime minister from the other - is a stabilizing factor only in the short 
term; in the long term such an informal practice may serve to damage national unity. If there is a conflict 
between the president and prime minister such a conflict might ‘personify’ the opinions of persons from 
the two regions, and this could have irreversible consequences. That occurred in the first half of 2007, 
when Prime-minister Felix Kulov (originating from the North) was dismissed, though there was then no 
other choice than to nominate another northern leader as a Prime-minister.  
12
 Linz, Juan, 'The Perils of Presidentialism', Journal of Democracy, winter 1990, p. 56. See also, Linz, 
Juan J. (with Arturo Valenzuela), The Failure of Presidential Democracy I: Comparative Perspectives. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.  
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3 How to solve the problem?  
As has been shown in the previous chapter, a traditional tribal/regional division is 
not a problem per se, for the reason here for the potential split in society is nepotism 
and corruption. All efforts, both from the civil sector and the state, should not be 
directed towards the regional division of Kyrgyzstan or in the direction of traditional 
solidarities, but against nepotism and corruption. A corruption decrease will lead to 
mechanisms of traditional solidarity being made useless and to state officials refusing 
to practice nepotism or produce policies based on regionalism.  
Corruption has many causes. The organizations of a civil society cannot have a 
direct influence on all of its causes (an example, low wages). Yet they can concentrate 
their work in those directions where they will be most successful: the promotion of 
national (trans-regional) political parties, civil control of personnel selection, and a 
change of behavior when it comes to questions of nepotism and corruption.  
3.1 Promotion of national (trans-regional) political parties 
After the change of authority in March, 2005, Kyrgyzstan started reforming the form 
of government that promoted authoritarianism, nepotism and corruption. According to 
the December 2006 edition of the Constitution, several new important trends have 
occurred with the shape of government. There will be more balanced distribution of 
powers; the powers of the president will be limited; parliament and the prime minister 
will have a more important role than beforehand; and judicial authority will be more 
independent. Also, the parliament will be formed on the basis of a majority-proportional 
system.   
In the given social realities, all of these gains are necessary conditions for reducing 
corruption, which fact will, in turn, lower the risks of regional division. The balanced 
distribution of powers will lead to reductions in abuse as the government will depend 
not on one person representing one group of interests (in this case a region) but on 
parliament, which consists of representatives from various groupings. Each deputy will 
be able to direct influence onto the government and, via this, really protect the interests 
of his social group. It will enhance the responsibility of the government before all 
groups of interests that are there in the parliament. The increase of political party 
influences can then, in the long-term, move the basic struggle in parliament from a 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES / INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
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regional plane onto the ideological one.
13
 Parliament, being a joint body representing 
(as an ideal) all social groupings, is the institute most protected from possible slips 
towards authoritarianism and family-clan rule. For research from such persons as Juan 
Linz and Fred Riggs shows that parliamentarism is less subject to the dangers of 
authoritarianism and corruption.  
However, in Kyrgyzstan, the institute of parliament and the system of political 
parties is only in the early stages of development. Political parties are seldom created 
on an ideological basis. The majority are clientilistic and charismatic parties.
14
 
Moreover, as has been noted by Valentin Bogatyrev, « (in Kyrgyzstan), as well as in 
other post-Soviet countries, the following are inherent to the party system: the large 
number of parties in all parts of a political spectrum, and the crushing of parties on the 
basis of personal, regional-ethnic, financial and economic concerns. (…) Parties act not 
so much a mechanism for the representation of the interests of relevant social layers 
on a political plane but are a tool for inter-clan and inter-corporate fighting for control 
over these or other resources ».
15
  
However, parliamentarism cannot change for the better without program-based 
political parties and without a stable political party system.
16
 The presence of national 
(trans-regional), program-based political parties aiming to solve not only narrow 
territorial-family problems but to make decisions regarding problems being experienced 
by the wider social group is necessary for the creation of a functional system of political 
parties. Such parties will be able to unite people from different territorial units, different 
ethnic and social groupings in one union, on the basis of their joint interests and 
ideological adherence. The effective association of citizens in such unions will lead to 
politics being practiced at levels of ideological opposition, which can consolidate 
society around such ideological struggle. 
Murat Imanaliev notes: « Institutes of a civil society should recognize (and, in 
parallel, induce authorities to do so) that Kyrgyzstan will never get rid of negative 
                                            
13
 For the regional division within Parliament see: Temirkulov, Azamat, “Tribalism, social conflict and the 
state-building process in the Kyrgyz Republic”, BOI-Journal (Berlin Osteuropa Institute), June 2004, 
Berlin.  
14
 According to Valentin Bogatyryov, there are three types of party in Kyrgyzstan: the parties in power, 
parties with charismatic leaders, and ideological parties. See Bogatyryov, Valentine, « The place and a 
role of political parties in Kirghiz society », in Political parties in Kyrgyzstan, Institute of Public Policy, 
Bishkek 2006, p. 30. 
15
 Bogatyrev, Valentin, Op. Cit., p. 30. 
16
 Croissant, Aurel, Merkel, Wolfgang, Political party formation in the presidential and parliamentary 
system, Online paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.  
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displays of traditionalism or nationalism until the political structure of society is 
represented not by clans-regional associations but by parties at the national level ».
17
 
Today, Kyrgyzstan’s NGOs have the required organizational potential and opportunities 
for the promoting of political parties. NGOs play an important role not only in the 
formation of a responsible society - they take active part in human rights protection and 
the promotion of democratic principles, too; and also provide a wide spectrum of social 
services. In 2006, 500 NGOs made use of more than 8 million US dollars for the 
realization of socially significant projects. In addition, some NGOs play a political role 
and indeed interfere in the fields of activity of political parties.
18
 According to an IRI 
opinion poll from May, 2007, 54% of the population trust NGOs, which is 9% more than 
those who trust in political parties (45%).
19
 
NGOs working to handle social problems and protect the most vulnerable layers of 
society ideologically reflect the concepts of the left and centre-left political parties. In 
general, they have common interests and purposes. Organizational and institutional 
resources from such NGOs can then be used in the support of political parties from the 
left and centre-left.  
NGOs can intensify interactions between political parties and the population, on one 
hand determining the electorate’s needs and lobbying for their interests in parliament 
via political parties - and, on the other, strengthening the positions of political parties 
within the population. This collaboration can have many positive effects:  
1)   Strengthening political parties: an interaction of political parties with NGOs 
could lead to the best understanding of problems being faced by the electorate and can 
help increase the population’s trust in a party, so that the electorate will become 
extended.  
2)   Intensification of competition between parties: increases in quality and in the 
electing of socially-orientated parties will bring forth responses from opponent parties 
that will result in active competition and, finally, will raise the qualitative level of all 
parties within the system.   
                                            
17
 Imanaliev, Murat, “Political parties in Kyrgyzstan», Political parties in Kyrgyzstan, Institute of Public 
Policy, Bishkek 2006, p. 55.  
18
 Обзор истории становления и развития сектора неправительственных организаций в 
Кыргызстане, Ассоциация Центров Поддержки Гражданского Общества, Бишкек, 2006, pp. 185-210.  
19
 Kyrgyzstan National Opinion Poll, IRI, May 2007, http://www.iri.org/eurasia/kyrgyzstan.asp 
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3)   Activation of the interaction of state bodies with civil society: political parties will 
act not only as intermediaries between state bodies and civil society but also as agents 
for the given social groupings within the state system.  
 
Such tendencies will have a positive influence on the creation of national (trans-
regional), strong political parties. In its turn, it will also strengthen the system of political 
parties and parliament. Strong national (trans-regional) parties in a strong parliament 
may not do away with but will certainly weaken the display of such phenomena as 
regional divisions and nepotism in official bodies and in the political arena generally.  
 
3.2 Combating nepotism and corruption  
 
As we saw in section 2.1, the problem of nepotism is closely linked to a problem of 
corruption; elements of nepotism in the hands of officials are tools by which to practice 
corruption. For a lowering of nepotism and corruption in state bodies it is necessary to 
have, first of all, control over personnel selection – i.e. in the area where nepotism 
flourishes most actively.  
“The regulation of competition when it comes to filling a vacant administrative state 
position in the Kirghiz Republic’s Public Service” (approved by a decision from the 
Council on Public Service from October, 28th, 2004 N2) stipulates how competition to 
find replacement personnel to fill a vacant position should be organized; it also 
provides for the creation of an attestation-competitive commission. The state body that 
has announced such a competition will form the commission, which will principally 
consist of public servants.
20
 As has been shown by experience, internal controls over 
personnel selection in the form of competition for vacant posts need not lead to 
success in the struggle against corruption and nepotism, for the attestation-competitive 
commission consists of state employees; and such employees are often merely 
interested in mutually supporting one another - they are neither neutral nor objective.  
Point 20 of the given regulation explains that “Independent experts or 
representatives of professional public associations may be invited to participate in the 
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work of the commission”. Thus, elements of external control can be admitted - although 
this factor does not have great force as, firstly, the attestation-competitive commissions 
will have been created by state bodies which, as said, cannot be relied upon as regards 
objectivity; and, secondly, civil society is not showing any initiative here.
21 
 
Nevertheless, external control over personnel selection to fill a vacant administrative 
state position is very relevant. Inclusion of representatives from civil society in a 
selection committee will give a character of transparency to the process; for officials will 
have many more difficulties trying to organize a non-fair personnel selection procedure 
in the presence of independent and non-partisan representatives from society at large. 
In turn, it will increase the value of the objectivity principle regarding employment and 
will promote the selection of more qualified personnel. Additionally, in the case of a 
contesting of results, participants can address themselves to civil society 
representatives, i.e. to independent and non-partisan commission members.  
These factors will lower the influence of kin and region and will also reduce the 
probability of the creation of informal relations between a subordinate and his ‘boss’. 
The result of such control will be a reduction in the practice of regionalism and 
nepotism in personnel selection and also a reduction of corruption in official bodies. 
The organizations of a civil society should take on board point 20, and use it to help 
create external control of personnel selection in official bodies.
22
 
One more problem is a lack of information available to people, i.e. that the reason 
for a potential split in society is not a traditional regional division, but nepotism and 
corruption. The population does not suspect that nepotism and corruption are the 
phenomena dividing the society into ’us and them’, so leading to a split. Moreover, 
given persons’ lack of information, politicians and officials can easily manage to make 
use of regional division rhetoric and also utilize traditional solidarity and traditional 
institutions for the achievement of their own narrow goals.  
Educating the population here could have a positive influence on the behavior of 
citizens with regard to regional division and corruption issues, making citizens aware 
                                                                                                                                            
20
 “Regulation dealing with competition to find personnel for vacant administrative state positions in the 
Kirghiz Republic’s Public Service” (approved by a decision from the Council for Public Service from 
October, 28th, 2004 N 2), clause N 19.  
21
 From interviews with employees from the National Agency for Public Service Affairs.  
22
 Representatives of civil society need not only be independent experts or representatives from 
professional public associations – they can also be former workers from the given organization who have 
retired/are on sabbatical. 
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that, behind speeches about regional-clan unity and solidarity - to the detriment of the 
other region, uruu, (an ethnic grouping, etc.) - lie the personal ambitions and interests 
of politicians and officials; and this would make it less easy to manipulate a given 
rhetoric. Awareness that corruption is not « a harmless prank » but a form of harm that 
might lead to a split in society will change the behavior of some citizens, and probably 
also of many civil servants.  
In this regard, it is necessary for NGOs to make efforts to educate people. It is 
necessary to show the population that the real harm is not from persons from the other 
region/family-clan group but from the corrupt official. Moreover, training in how to react 
to corruption cases will also have a positive effect.  
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4 Recommendations  
Within the limits of the Strategy of Development for the Country 2007-2010, civil society 
can make a major contribution to the struggle against nepotism, regionalism and 
corruption. In particular, NGOs can promote the development of national (trans-
regional) political parties and a reduction of nepotism and corruption in state structures; 
they can also give the population the necessary knowledge in the struggle against 
corruption. To do this, it is necessary to act as follows.  
 
With the purpose of creating close mutual relations/cooperation between the civil 
sector and political parties, it is recommended that NGOs: 
1)   Identify political parties that are close to them in their own purposes and 
ideological conceptions;
23
  
2)   Create permanent organizational structures (forums, councils, etc.) for closer 
cooperation with political parties having a related ideology; 
3)   Coordinate their work with a given political party, lobby for the most essential 
laws, etc. 
 
With a purpose of building up "external" controls over personnel selection in official 
bodies, it is recommended that NGOs:  
1)   Identify ministries, agencies and other state structures that can respond to 
interests and specific requirements emanating from a given NGO;
24
 
2)   Coordinate, with a human resources service from involved establishments, the 
participation of civil sector representatives in the attestation-competitive commissions;  
3)   Coordinate such an initiative with the Council and Agency of KR in relation to 
public service dealings with a view to obtaining their aid and support.
25 
 
 
To be able to educate the population as regards nepotism and corruption, NGOs 
should:  
                                            
23
 The list of political parties and their coordinates can be found on the site of the Central Electoral 
Committee <http://www.shailoo.gov.kg>   
24
 For a list of the Ministries, agencies and other state structures, with coordinates, see: http://www.gov/kg  
25
 Coordinates from the Agency of KR for Public Service Affairs, in Appendix 1.  
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1)   Develop and bring to fruition projects dealing with the education of the 
population in questions of nepotism and corruption, according to the requirements of 
donors;
26
  
2)   Help facilitate a desire to cooperate with National Agency experts on the 
prevention of corruption in development and project realization;
27 
 
3)   Help facilitate the desire to involve experts from research centers and 
consulting firms in the creating and carrying out of projects.
28 
 
 
                                            
26
 The list of donors who support activities fighting corruption can be found at http://www.donors.kg 
27
 Coordinates for the National Agency on Prevention of Corruption, see Appendix 1.  
28
 List of research centers, see Appendix 2.  
AZAMAT TEMIRKULOV: COMBATING OPEN SOCIETY THREATS: REGIONALISM, NEPOTISM AND CORRUPTION 
 
 20 
References 
 
Alexander I. D. The evolution of social behavior, Annual Review of Anthropology 5: 
325-383, 1974.  
Bogatyryov, Valentine, « The Place and a role of political parties in Kirghiz society », 
in Political parties in Kyrgyzstan, Institute of Public Policy, Bishkek 2006. 
Combating corruption in a transition period, World Bank, Washington, Federal 
District of Columbia, 2000. 
Struggle against corruption in a transition period. A contribution to a discussion of 
strategy, the World bank, Washington, Federal district of Columbia, 2000.  
Croissant, Aurel, Merkel, Wolfgang: Political party formation in a presidential and 
parliamentary system, Online paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.  
Третьяков, А., Гражданское общество и власть. Культура отношений, Журнал 
«Третий сектор», В. № 1, Сентябрь 2005 год. 
CPI (Corruption Perception Index) 2007, Transparency International. 
Imanaliev, Murat, “ Party construction in Kyrgyzstan », in Political parties in 
Kyrgyzstan, Institute of Public Policy, Bishkek 2006.  
Исраилова-Харьехузен Ч. Р., Традиционное общество кырыгзов в период 
русской колонизации во второй половине ХIX – начале XX в., и система их 
родства, Илим, Бишкек, 1999. 
Kyrgyzstan National Opinion Poll, IRI, May 2007: 
http://www.iri.org/eurasia/kyrgyzstan.asp 
Linz, Juan, ' The Perils of Presidentialism ', Journal of Democracy, winter 1990. 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES / INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
 21 
Обзор истории становления и развития сектора неправительственных 
организаций в Кыргызстане, Ассоциация Центров Поддержки Гражданского 
Общества, Бишкек, 2006.  
Vanhanen, Tatu, “Domestic ethnic conflict and ethnic nepotism: A comparative 
analysis”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 1, 55-73 (1999) 
Temirkulov, Azamat: Tribalism, social conflict and the state-building process in the 
Kyrgyz Republic, BOI-Journal (Berlin Osteuropa Institute), June 2004, Berlin. 
AZAMAT TEMIRKULOV: COMBATING OPEN SOCIETY THREATS: REGIONALISM, NEPOTISM AND CORRUPTION 
 
 22 
Appendices 
Appendix 1. Coordinates  
 
Name Coordinates 
National Council of KR on 
Public Service Affairs 
Has no permanent address 
Contact via the National Agency KR on Public Service 
Affairs 
National Agency KR on 
Public Service Affairs 
Bishkek, street Razzakova, 59 
62-75-22, 62-73-67 
<http: // www.csa.gov.kg> 
National Council on the 
Struggle against Corruption 
Has no permanent address 
Contact via the National Agency KR on Public Service 
Affairs 
National Agency on 
Corruption Prevention  
 
Bishkek, street Kiev, 96, a 3-floor 
900-469, 900-378, 901-644, 900-436 
www.nacp.kg 
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Appendix 2. List of research centers and consulting firms 
 
 Name Address Telephone no. Email 
1 Aiten group Kievskaia 149 
Bishkek 
61-20-00 
61-20-02 
info@aitengroup.com 
www.aitengroup.com 
2 Institute of 
Public Policy 
Isanova 42/1 
Bishkek 
+996(312) 215763 office@ipp.kg 
http://www.ipp.kg 
3 MNT 
Consulting 
Toktogula 96/2 
Bishkek 
66-46-87 
62-36-96 
62-37-81 
info@mntconsulting.org 
www.mntconsulting.org 
4 M-Vector Ahunbaeva 42 a 
Bishkek 
51-18-15 
51-08-29 
office@m-vector.com 
www.m-vector.com 
5 Siar-Бишкек Chui, 164, a 
rooms 406-411 
Bishkek 
21-08-33 
21-09-25 
66-36-36 
siar@mail.kg;office@si
ar-consult.com 
6 Foundation for 
innovative 
technologies, 
"Terra Public" 
Frunze 282 a 
Bishkek 
+10 996 (312) 28 
05 36 
terra_public@mail.ru 
www.shailoo.kg 
 
7 Center for 
social research, 
National 
Academy of 
Science 
Chui 265-a, 
room 328 
Bishkek 
(996) (312) 24 37 
35 
Fax: (996) (312) 
21 85 22 
nurbekcsr@freenet.kg 
 
 
